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I. INTRODUCTION
An individual's identity is comprised of many different characteristics.
The law has historically recognized the existence of a property right in
certain characteristics of an individual, such as name and likeness.' This
recognition was premised on the idea that these characteristics comprise
the essence of a person's identity and therefore, should be protected
against appropriation by others.2
A problem in this area, however, has been the confusion among prop-
erty,3 privacy,4 and publicity5 rights. Each of these rights touches the area
* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor John Makdisi,
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
'See Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540 (1891); Minton v. Smith, 276
Ill. App. 128 (1934) (court held plaintiff had a property right in her name which
could not be appropriated by another in his business); Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Pollard v. Photograph Co., 40 Ch.D.
345 (1888) (photographer restrained from exhibiting extra copies of a portrait he
contracted to make).
2 See supra note 1. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1976).
1 A property right is defined as "[a] generic term which refers to any type of
right to specific property whether it is personal or real property, tangible or
intangible; e.g. professional baseball player has valuable property right in his
name, photograph and image, and such right may be saleable by him." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1096 (5th ed. 1983) (citation omitted).
I A right of privacy is defined as "[t]he right to be let alone; the right of a
person to be free from unwarranted publicity." Id. at 1075.
'A publicity right is defined as "the right of a celebrity to control and profit
from the use of his name and likeness." Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability
Reconsidered, 49 FoRDHAM L. REV. 453 (1981).
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of personal characteristics; however, the focus of each right is on a distinct
area.6 The confusion between these rights has inhibited the evolutionary
development of property rights. Therefore, in order to clearly evaluate
the evolution and interpretation of property rights, a preliminary dis-
cussion of these three rights and the context in which they arise is nec-
essary.
The purpose of this note, however, is not the distinction among these
three rights. Rather, it is an investigation into the history of property
rights relating to personal characteristics. The object of this investigation
is to determine whether property rights exist in certain discrete char-
acteristics or whether property rights attach to the more nebulous concept
of identity.
II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROPERTY, PRIVACY,
AND PUBLICITY RIGHTS
Considerable confusion exists among property, privacy, and publicity
rights.7 Each of these rights has the potential to be used as the basis of
a cause of action for the appropriation of personal characteristics. How-
ever, each right is generally pursued in a particular context.
The confusion among these rights arose primarily because legal schol-
ars chose to develop privacy and publicity rights by mooring them in
property.8 These rights, however, are distinct and serve particular func-
See infra notes 12-73 and accompanying text.
See Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Tullos, 219 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1955) (court upheldjudgment against defendant for use of plaintiffs photograph for advertising pur-
poses); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.W.2d 742 (1952);
McCreery v. Miller's Grocerteria, 99 Colo. 499, 64 P.2d 803 (1936).
8 Legal scholars have traditionally propounded the theory that privacy and
publicity rights developed from their initial mooring in property rights. See infra
notes 12-73 and accompanying text. A diagram of the emergence of these three
rights may appear as follows. The dotted arrow represents a right that has





The emergence of these rights as depicted above, however, actually represents
as faulty line of reasoning or an illegitimate marriage. The right of privacy was
conceptualized as having its origins in the established right of property in order
to give the newly developed right credibility. As two scholars once noted: "in the
process of searching for this right [privacy], they [Warner and Brandeis] succeeded
in inventing it." Felcher and Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real
People by the Media, 88 YALE L. J. 1577, 1581 (1979). See also infra notes 12-33
and accompanying text. A more accurate depiction of the status of these rights





HOW MUCH OF YOU DO YOU REALLY OWN?
tions. Privacy rights developed to protect the right to be let alone, and
are premised upon an injury to feelings. 9 Publicity rights are concerned
with the right of a celebrity to control and profit from the use of his name
and likeness. '0 Property rights, however, are much broader in scope. They
are based on the exclusive right to possess, enjoy, and dispose of a thing
or characteristic."
The confusion among these three rights has hindered the development
of a uniform theory regarding property interests in the area of personal
characteristics and identity. In order to clearly discuss this area, a pre-
liminary distinction among property, privacy, and publicity must be
drawn.
A. Property Rights Versus Privacy Rights
1. Right of Privacy Defined
The right of privacy has been defined as "the right to be left alone, to
have one's personal feelings undisturbed and be free of emotional upset.1
2
The origin of this right is generally attributed to Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis's article, The Right to Privacy.3 Warren and Brandeis
developed this right by suggesting that "the term 'property' had grown
to comprise every form of possession - intangible, as well as tangible.'
14
However, Warren and Brandeis recognized that property was "tied with
the material rather than the spiritual,"'15 and thus realized that property
itself was an inadequate concept upon which to base privacy rights. They
concluded that the right of privacy is based on the "right to be let alone"
or the "inviolate personality" and the "more general right to the immunity
of the person-the right to one's personality."' 6
Since its development by Warren and Brandeis, the legal concept of a
right of privacy has gained acceptance in the common law and is now
recognized in most jurisdictions.'7 However, the right of privacy has often
9 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 851-
869 (5th ed. 1984).
10 Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1588.
,1 See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (5th ed. 1983).
12 Sims, supra note 5 at 461.
,3 The term "right to privacy" was first used in T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTs 29
(2d ed. 1888). It was then quoted in Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890). Privacy rights actually developed from the personal
experiences of Mr. Warren. He became particularly upset by lurid newspaper
accounts of his wife's social life. He consulted with his long-time friend and law
partner, Mr. Brandeis, regarding these invasions, and the result was their article
detailing the right of privacy. Id. at 196.
,4 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13, at 193.
" Id. at 197.
16 Id. at 207.
17 Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55
N.W.U.L. REV. 553,554 (1960). The right of privacy has developed not as a residual
category but as an independent legal concept. Although the right is recognized
in almost all jurisdictions, conflicts regarding when the right applies are frequent.
"Specifically, it becomes necessary to explain why the right of privacy applies in
19891
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been confused with the right of property. Although Warren and Brandeis
chose not to base the right of privacy on property rights, they did anchor
privacy rights in property. This caused much confusion as privacy rights
developed.18
Dean Prosser was instrumental in developing Warren and Brandeis's
right of privacy. He used the right of privacy as a catch-all phrase to
cover four distinct tortious causes of action. 19 Prosser's four distinct torts
are: (1) intrusion upon physical solitude; (2) public disclosure of private
facts; (3) publicity that places someone in a false light; and (4) appropri-
ation of one's name or likeness for another's benefit.2-
Although Prosser placed these four categories of torts under the catch-
all rubric of privacy, he noted that the tort of appropriation was "quite
a different matter"21 from the other three torts he set out due to its element
of unauthorized commercial exploitation.22 That is, Prosser did not dis-
tinguish between privacy and property rights. Many courts, however,
recognized that the appropriation tort is an aspect of property while the
other three, which comprise the right of privacy, are based on something
other than property.23 Prosser also recognized this distinction, yet con-
cluded that "[it seems quite pointless to dispute over whether such a
right is to be classified as 'property'. ' ' 24
This conclusion, however, is not supported by the privacy right as de-
veloped by Warren and Brandeis. 5 When Warren and Brandeis developed
the right of privacy by using property rights as the frame for privacy,
one may conclude, as Prosser did, that the property analysis is now su-
perfluous. 26 However, Warren and Brandeis did not have this in mind.
They argued that privacy was based on expanded notions beyond, not
instead of, the traditional confines of property.27
certain situations, but must yield to the First Amendment in others. One common
explanation is based on the idea of waiver; a public figure is viewed as having
waived his right of privacy by virtue of his status." Felcher & Rubin, supra note
8 at 1586. This explanation later developed into the legal concept of a right of
publicity. See infra notes 61-73 and accompanying text. This tension between
rights is a primary reason to distinguish property, privacy, and publicity rights.
This type of separation allows both private and public figures to maintain a cause
of action when an aspect of their personality is appropriated.
18 See supra note 8. The right of privacy developed to such a degree that it
"now threatens to become a sort-of catch-all" phrase for any case involving in-
fringements of one's personality. Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REv. 237(1932). This is another facet contributing to the confusion between privacy and
property.
19 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971).
20 Id. The American Law Institute later adopted these four types of privacy
invasions in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 652A, 652B, 652C, 652D, 652E (1976).21 Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALiF. L. REV. 383, 406 (1960).
22 Id.
Many courts have recognized the property right in the use of a person's name
or likeness. See Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Ettore
v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 926 (1956).
Prosser, supra note 21, at 406.
Terrell & Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual
and Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1, 10 (1985).
26 Id.
I Id. at 10-11.
[Vol. 37:3
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The distinct difference between classic invasion of privacy cases 28 and
proprietary appropriations for commercial exploitation 29 illustrates the
need to separate privacy and appropriation. There is some element of
personality appropriation in every privacy case. However, the phrase
commercial exploitation connotes appropriation for commercial use. This
includes appropriating an aspect of personality to imply that a person is
endorsing a product or consenting to the use of his or her personality.
30
It is recognized that the "right to be free from commercial exploitation,
rather than the 'right to be let alone', constitutes a firmer basis for grant-
ing relief and for the assessment of damages."31 This is a major reason
why the analyses of many scholars, including Prosser, are underinclusive.
The conclusion that classifying the appropriation tort as property is
irrelevant has contributed to the confusion surrounding property and
privacy rights.3 2 It must be recognized that privacy is only one of several
aspects of personality that is subject to appropriation. As Dean Leon
Green recognized: "To bring cases involving the appropriation of all
28 Classic instances of invasion of privacy include the following: Welsh v. Prit-
chard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952) (invasion of a tenant's living room by
a landlord upon non-payment of rent); Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga. App. 445, 64
S.E.2d 87 (1951) (sheriff entering plaintiffs home without a search warrant);
Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931) (tapping plaintiffs telephone
wires); Itzkewitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 478, 39 So. 449 (1913) (police retaining
finger prints of accused after acquittal). Gordon, supra note 17, at 556.
29There is some debate over whether the appropriation must be used for com-
mercial exploitation. See infra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
30 Gordon, supra note 17, at 557; see also W. PROSSER, supra note 19, at 853-
55.
31 Gordon, supra note 17, at 555. The harm that arises when a personal attribute
is appropriated for the unauthorized endorsement of a commercial product is both
personal and economic. The personal aspect of the injury arises from the false
implication that a business relationship exists between the advertiser and the
individual portrayed. This misrepresents the individual's transactions. In ad-
dressing this type of personal damages the court will only look to the advertise-
ment itself to determine if it implies an endorsement. In the absence of a contrary
finding a court will generally impose liability to support the public policy of
encouraging honest commercial practices. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1612-
13. Economic injury arises when effect of the portrayal is to limit the person's
ability to profit from his name, likeness, or characteristics. The key to this type
of recovery is proving an economic loss due to the identifiability of the person
portrayed. This may be proved by showing that the person was in the process of
earning money from the particular attributes appropriated by the portrayal. Id.
at 1613-14.
32 The recognition of the distinction between property rights and privacy rights
will also clarify the rights of the next of kin of a deceased person. The right of
privacy is a personal right and is therefore nonassignable. It rests in the individual
during his lifetime and dies with him at his death. A property right, on the other
hand, accrues to the deceased's estate for the benefit of his next of kin. Therefore,
if an individual possesses a property right in his name or likeness, these rights
do not pass into the public domain after death. They remain in the decedent's
estate. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1593; see also Maritote v. Desilu
Productions Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965); Miller
v. Universal Pictures Co., 18 Misc.2d 626, 188 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
1989]
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phases of personality under this title [privacy] creates a disturbing sense
of artificiality. The term is too narrow and too lacking in descriptive
coloring."33
2. Confusion Between Property and Privacy Rights
The confusion surrounding property and privacy rights arose primarily
because litigants generally chose to sue under a privacy theory even
though injury to feelings, upon which a privacy action is based, had little
or only secondary application. 34 These litigants would have had a greater
chance of success had they chosen to sue under a property theory based
on the actual appropriation of the name or likeness for commercial ex-
ploitation.35 An example of this situation is illustrated in Roberson V.
Rochester Folding Box Company.36 In Roberson, a flour company circu-
lated Abigail Roberson's photograph without her consent in an advertis-
ing circular. Upon learning of this, Roberson claimed she was emotionally
1 Green, supra note 18, at 239. Dean Green recognizes the need for more
accurate classification in cases affecting interests of personality. He suggests that
instead of using the catch-all of privacy, a classification of harms would clarify
the situation:
Harms are of three general types - (1) physical harms, (2) harms of
appropriation, (3) harms of defamation. In most cases the type of harm
stands out clearly. In some they all may be present, or may be found
in varied combinations.... The tort cases which courts most frequently
bring under the "privacy" rubic, or else treat as anamolies, involve an
interest of personality which has been subjected to the harm of appro-
priation. The appropriation of the personality or someone of its phases
is not a familiar idea to the lawyer. Nevertheless, if the idea is de-
scriptive of the cases, it has the advantage of being familiar in other
connections, as, for example, the "conversion" cases and there is no
good reason why it should not be employed here.
Id. Dean Green further recognized the interests of personality as: (1) physical
integrity; (2) feelings or emotions; (3) capacity for activity or service; (4) names;(5) likeness; (6) history; and (7) privacy. Id.
4 Gordon, supra note 17, at 554; see also infra notes 36-59 and accompanying
text.
Id. at 569 (citing United States Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 238 S.W.2d 289(Tex. Civ. App. 1951)). In this case an insurance company mailed soliciting letters
to customers using a facsimile of the plaintiffs signature who was designated as
"manager" after he had left their employment. The court held that the non-
recognition by Texas of the right of privacy was of no importance to this case
because the plaintiff had not based his cause of action on privacy rights. The
court further held that:
[tihe use of an individual's signature for business purposes unques-
tionably constitutes the exercise of a valuable right of property in the
broadest sense of that term.... In this broad sense, we have no doubt
that the unauthorized use of appellee's name and signature by appel-
lants, regardless of why it was so used, constitutes such wrongful con-
duct on their part as to entitle appellee to the receiving of nominal
damages even though no actual damages were shown.
Id. at 292.
171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). See also Gordon, supra note 17, at 557-
59, for a general discussion of this case.
[Vol. 37:3
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injured from the unauthorized use of her likeness for advertising pur-
poses.37 The New York Court of Appeals, in a 4 to 3 decision, reversed
the trial court. The Appellate Court refused recovery because it could
find no legal precedent for Warren and Brandeis's right to privacy upon
which Roberson relied.8
If, however, Abigail Roberson had based her claim on the unauthorized
commercial appropriation of her property interest in her likeness rather
than expressly for the injury to her feelings, the result of the case might
have been different. 39 In dictum, the majority of the New York Appellate
Court indicated that to succeed in her claim the plaintiff had to prove
either a breach of trust or that the plaintiff had a property right in the
subject of the litigation which the court could protect. In Roberson the
court held that the plaintiff was unable to prove either of these two
requirements.40 The fundamental basis for this conclusion was the fact
that the plaintiff sued for injury to her feelings. 41 The court pointed out
that there was no complaint that the plaintiff was libeled by the publi-
cation of her portrait and that the likeness was a good one recognizable
by her friends and acquaintances. 4 The court stated that a recognition
of the right to sue for invasion of privacy for injury to one's feelings
because of the publication of one's likeness would lead to litigation bor-
dering on the absurd.43
The Roberson decision has been widely criticized. Justice Gray's dis-
senting opinion has received almost universal support as the better law.
44
Justice Gray based his dissent on the need created for new legal concepts
due to progress in the fields of arts and sciences45 and "on the property
rights of the plaintiff in her likeness."46 He stated that:
Property is not necessarily the thing itself which is owned, it
is the right of the owner in relation to it. The right to be
protected in one's possession of a thing or in one's privileges,
belonging to him as an individual, or secured to him as a mem-
ber of the commonwealth, is property .... I think this plaintiff
has the same property in the right to be protected against the
use of her face for defendant's commercial purposes ... if her
face or her portraiture has a value, the value is hers exclusively,
until the use be granted away to the public.
47
17 Abigail Roberson claimed she was "greatly humiliated by the scoffs and jeers
of persons who recognized her face and picture ... and her good name had been
attacked causing her great distress and suffering both in mind and body." Id. at
542-43, 64 N.E. at 442.38 Gordon, supra note 17, at 558.
39 Id.
I Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 543, 549, 64 N.E. at 445, 447.
411d. at 542-43, 64 N.E. at 447-48.
42 Id. at 542, 64 N.E. at 442-43.
Id. at 545, 64 N.E. at 443.
Gordon, supra note 17, at 558; see also Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J.
Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62 (1967); Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122
Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 561-65, 64 N.E. at 449-50.
Gordon, supra note 17, at 558.
, Id. at 565, 64 N.E. at 450.
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Justice Gray thus recognized the property rights in an individual's name
or likeness and the viability of a claim when these attributes are appro-
priated by another.
Another example of the confusion of remedy that occurs when a suit
is based on injury to feelings or a right of privacy rather than the actual
appropriation of the property right is found in O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.48
O'Brien, a well-known college football player, sued for the unauthorized
commercial use of his picture on a calendar featuring a beer advertise-
ment. The publicity department of the university which O'Brien attended
had sought publicity for him by broadcasting his photograph throughout
the country. The publicity department also sold a print for one dollar to
the publishing company which had requested it for a calendar. The pub-
lishing company, however, did not mention the proposed beer advertise-
ment that was to be featured on the calendar. 49 The court held that since
O'Brien himself, through the university, was seeking publicity there was
no invasion of privacy.5"
The court, in dictum, implies that its finding would have been different
if O'Brien had based his action on the appropriation of his property right
in his likeness, rather than basing his claim upon injury to feelings.5' If
O'Brien had based his claim on the appropriation, he would have had to
show that he had a property right in the characteristic appropriated and
that this appropriation had been for the purpose of commercial exploi-
tation. These elements are present in O'Brien and he would have likely
succeeded had a case based on this property right been made.
Justice Holmes argued in his dissent that recovery could have been
allowed for the proprietary appropriation even though this claim was not
expressly made. 52 Holmes recognized that the right of privacy is distinct
from the right to use one's name or picture for the purpose of commercial
advertisement. 3 He concludes that the latter, "is a property right that
belongs to everyone. '54 This conclusion implies that since property rights
belong to everyone, a litigant does not need to expressly claim the ap-
propriation of his property rights in order to succeed on such a claim.
124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942). See also
Gordon, supra note 17, at 564-65.
49 124 F.2d at 169.
10 Id. at 170.
61 Id. No injury to feelings occurred from the publication of the picture due to
the fact that O'Brien himself was seeking publicity.
12 Id. at 171.
- Id.
54Id. at 170. Justice Holmes's recognition of the right to use one's name for
the purpose of commercial advertisement is similar to Prosser's appropriation
tort. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. Prosser, however, includes
this tort under the umbrella of privacy. A more accurate distinction is to recognize
that a property right exists in certain personal characteristics and a cause of
action arises when these characteristics are appropriated for commercial purposes.
This distinction allows a litigant to have a broader range of interests in which
to maintain a cause of action. A public figure, such as O'Brien, will not succeed
in a suit for invasion of privacy, yet could conceivably succeed in a suit based on
the property aspect of the appropriation. This shows the over-inclusiveness that
is inherent in Prosser's classification.
[Vol. 37:3
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Much of the confusion between property and privacy rights arose be-
cause the litigant did not base his cause of action upon the appropriate
right.55 Holmes' theory of an implied cause of action for property rights
would have eliminated much of this confusion. However, case law indi-
cates that this theory has not been adopted. In order to succeed in an
action regarding personal characteristics, the plaintiff must assert the
appropriate right or rights. 56
The context in which a privacy or property right should be pursued is
clear. If the central issue in the case is injury to feelings due to an invasion
of privacy, a privacy action should be brought.5 7 However, if the central
issue is the appropriation of the litigant's name or likeness, a suit based
upon property rights should be maintained.58 These actions are not, how-
ever, mutually exclusive. A litigant may choose to bring both claims
jointly.59 To succeed on both claims, however, he must be prepared to show
separate and conclusive evidence to support both claims.
6 0
B. Property Right Versus Right of Publicity
The right of publicity is defined as a right that allows a celebrity who
has used his or her personality for commercial purposes to protect the
value of the name or appearance.6 1 A celebrity or public figure is defined
as someone whose identity would be recognized by a stranger.
6 2 A non-
public figure is one who would only be recognized by personal acquaint-
ancesi5 There has been considerable controversy surrounding the issue
of whether the right of publicity is peculiarly celebrity-based or extends
to include non-public persons.64 The majority of cases and commentators,
however, suggest that the right is celebrity-based.
6 5
55 See supra notes 34-51 and accompanying text.
56 Id.
11 See supra notes 36-59 and accompanying text.
58 Gordon, supra note 17, at 556-565.
19 See Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Ea. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907);
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
60 Id. There are, however, certain courts and commentators who consider the
distinction between personal and property rights to be irrelevant. The Su-
preme Court in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972)
stated:
[Tlhe dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one.
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy prop-
erty without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the
right to travel, is in truth a "personal" right, whether property in question
be a welfare check, a home or a savings account.
See also Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).11 Sims, supra note 5, at 453.
62 Id. at 467.
- Id.
c Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative
Value of Personality, 39 VArND. L. REV. 1199, 1200 n.3 (1986).
" Id. See also Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1589-90; Martin Luther King,
Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products Inc., 250 Ga.
135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
1989]
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The right of publicity is a legal concept that emerged from the law of
privacy. The emergence of this right was justified by characterizing it as
a property right.66 The right of privacy was inadequate to cover all non-
defamatory portrayals that caused injury to personal interests that are
identifiable. For example, portrayals that cause injury to well-known
people do not fit well within the privacy right because the celebrity's
complaint "is not that they received publicity, but that they have failed
to receive its benefits. T6 7 Therefore, the independent right of publicity
subsequently emerged.
The first case that recognized the publicity right was Haelan Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum.r8 The court in Haelan held that a
celebrity has a right to damages and other relief for the unauthorized
commercial appropriation of the celebrity's persona. The court held that
there was a legally cognizable right to photograph a person. In reaching
this conclusion, the court stated: "We think that, in addition to and in-
dependent of [the] right of privacy.. . a man has a right in the publicity
value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of
publishing his picture ... ."19 The right of publicity gradually gained
acceptance after the Haelan Laboratories decision. It is now judicially
Nimmer, Right of Publicity, 19 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 201, 216 (1954).
67 Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1588. The right of privacy is premised on
the right to be let alone. However, this right seems contradictory when it is applied
to public persons. A public figure often has difficulty in maintaining an invasion
of privacy suit because he is often deemed as "having waived his right of privacy
by virtue of his status." Id. at 1586. This, however, is a fictional legal conclusion.
A legal waiver is defined as the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of such
a right. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1417 (5th ed. 1979). It has been recognized
that:
[S]omeone has voluntarily agreed to publicity about his private life
when he accepts a part in a motion picture [etc.].... The concept of
waiver involved in these cases ... is a constructive waiver - in other
words, it is merely a way of restating the conclusion that public figures
have no right of privacy due to the countervailing and more powerful
commands of the First Amendment.
Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1587.
Thus, when a public figure does maintain a suit for invasion of privacy, his
complaint is generally that he has failed to receive the benefits of the publicity.
Id. at 1588. It would be more accurate, however, for the public figure to bring a
suit based on his property rights in the characteristic appropriated.
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
69 Id. at 868. Professor Nimmer concurred in this conclusion in Nimmer, supra
note 66, at 203. Nimmer recognized that:
The nature of the inadequacy of the traditional legal theories dictates
in large measure the substance of the right of publicity. The right of
publicity must be recognized as a property (not a personal) right, and
as such capable of assignment and subsequent enforcement by the
assignee. Furthermore, appropriation of publicity values should be ac-
tionable regardless of whether the defendant has used the publicity in
a manner offensive to the sensibilities of the plaintiff . . . Likewise,
the measure of damages should be computed in terms of the value of
the publicity appropriated by the defendant rather than, as in privacy,
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recognized in a substantial number of jurisdictions7 ° and has set the
foundation for another cause of action.
Confusion has been generated in this area by the similarity between
the right of publicity and the proprietary appropriation of one's name or
likeness.7 1 The right of publicity, however, "rests on the idea of damage
to property of demonstrated economic worth. '72 Therefore, "it does not
extend to the misappropriation of a person's name or likeness when that
person has not previously exploited these attributes in some commercial
manner."
73
C. Inadequacy of Privacy and Publicity Rights
The emergence of privacy and publicity rights has not eclipsed the
viability of property rights. An individual's rights are not fully protected
under either privacy or publicity theories. The existence of a property
action must be recognized in the area of personal characteristics.
Property rights are necessary to fill the gaps left by privacy and pub-
licity rights. For example, an individual whose likeness is appropriated
and used in an advertisement may maintain a privacy action if he can
show this appropriation invaded his privacy and injured his feelings.7 4 If
70 The right of publicity has been explicitly recognized in such cases as Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St.2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 70 Cal.
App.3d 556, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1977).
71 Some courts and commentators have even concluded that the distinction
between property and publicity rights is irrelevant. Judge Frank in Haelan Lab-
oratories regarded the characterization of the right as a property right to be an
arbitrary exercise in classification. He wrote that "[wihether [the right] is labelled
a 'property' right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag simply
symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has peculiary worth." Haelan
Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). However,
distinguishing property and publicity rights is of vital importance in eliminating
the confusion between these rights. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying
discussion.
72 Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1591 n.78. Property that is generally
regarded to have demonstrated economic worth is comprised of those attributes
that a public person uses to make a living. Id. at 1615. There are several under-
lying rationales for protecting publicity rights: (1) such protection "provides an
economic incentive ... to make the investment required to produce a performance
of interest to the public." Id. at 1615. See also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
casting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The Zacchini court upheld a right of publicity
claim against a first amendment attack where the defendant television station
had broadcast the entirety of plaintiffs human cannonball act; (2) such protection
prevents "unjust enrichment by the theft of good will." Id. There is no social
purpose served by having the defendant take some aspect of the plaintiff that
ordinarily has market value, for free. See also Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law -
Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966);
(3) protection of publicity interests guards the public against such deceptions as
the false endorsement of products. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1600.
73 Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1591 n.78.
74 See supra notes 13-60 and accompanying text. See also Sims, supra note 5,
at 465-67.
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this individual is a public person he may be able to assert his publicity
rights.75 However, in each instance if this plaintiff could not show the
requisite elements for privacy76 and/or publicity77 rights he would be left
without a cause of action. Recognizing the existence of property rights
would allow the individual to assert a claim based on the violation of his
ownership in his identity.
III. ESTABLISHED PROPERTY RIGHTS
A person's identity is captured by many different characteristics. The
best known characteristics by which an individual is recognized, however,
are his name and/or likeness. The common law has recognized the im-
portance of these characteristics and has accorded protection to them
through the recognition of property rights in name and/or likeness. 78
A. Property Rights in Name and Likeness
A property right in one's name and likeness is well established in the
common law.79 This protection is supported by public policy considerations
75 See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text. See also Sims, supra note 5,
at 465-67.
76 See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902)(the court held the likeness of the plaintiff appropriated by the defendant was a
good one and could not have injured the plaintiffs feelings).
11 Several courts and commentators have held that a non-public person may
not assert publicity rights. This considerably narrows the scope and application
of publicity rights. See Halpern, supra note 64, at 1200-02.
78 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, at 852-54.
" Gordon, supra note 17, at 611-12; see also Green, supra note 18, at 243-48.
It must also be recognized that certain states have enacted statutes that give an
individual a cause of action when his name or likeness is appropriated. An ex-
ample of such a statute is the New York Civil Rights Law. It has been recognized
that "New York cases, even though based on statute, have often been regarded
as leading precedents and have become part of the common law tradition." Felcher
& Rubin, supra note 8, at 1582 n.31. This statute states, in pertinent part:§ 50 Right of Privacy: A person, firm or corporation that uses for ad-
vertising purposes, or for the purpose of trade, the name, portrait or
picture of any living person without first having obtained the written
consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian,
is guilty of a misdemeanor.
§ 51. Action for Injunction and Damages: Any person whose name,
portrait or picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or
for the purpose of trade without the written consent first obtained as
above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court
of this state against the person, firm or corporation using his name,
portrait or picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may
recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use and
if the defendant shall have knowingly used such person's name, portrait
or picture in such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful
by section fifty of this article the jury in its discretion may award
exemplary damages.
These statutes are often premised on a right of privacy, however, they actually
come closer to Prosser's appropriations tort and the common law property right.
See supra notes 15-32 and accompanying text. o
[Vol. 37:3
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol37/iss3/7
HOW MUCH OF YOU DO YOU REALLY OWN?
such as the interest in controlling the effect on one's reputation, con-
trolling the use of one's personality, and the prevention of unjust enrich-
ment of those who appropriate the value of another's identity.80
Various courts have recognized the property interests in one's name
and likeness."' For example, in Edison v. Edison Polyform Manufacturing
Co.,8 2 Thomas Edison sought to enjoin a company which sold medicinal
preparations from using the name and picture of Edison as part of its
corporate title or in connection with its business. Edison also sought to
enjoin the defendant from using his name, picture or endorsement on the
label of defendant's product or as part of defendant's advertising.8 3 The
court granted the injunction holding that a man's name and features are
his property.84 The court realized that the essence of an individual is
captured in his name and likeness and therefore, these characteristics
must be protected against unlawful appropriation."
Although many cases dealing with the appropriation of one's name or
likeness involve public figures, 6 this interest is not limited to such in-
dividuals. It extends equally to both public and non-public8 7 figures.,8
This is a crucial difference between privacy and publicity rights. Courts
have been reluctant to uphold invasion of privacy claims made by public
- Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likeness, and Personal History,
51 TEX. L. REV. 637 (1973).
81 Uproar v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934), mod-
ified, 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1936) (where property
rights were recognized in the name "Graham McNamee," a well-known radio
announcer); United States Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 238 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1951) (where an insurance company mailed soliciting letters using a fas-
cimile of plaintiff's signature in which plaintiff was designated "manager" after
he had left their employment); Munde v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076
(1911) (where plaintiff was held to have a property interest in his picture).
12 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907).
83Id.
"The court concluded that:
If a man's name be his own property as no less an authority than the
United States Supreme Court says it is ... it is difficult to understand
why the peculiar cast of one's features is not also one's property and
why its pecuniary value if it has one, does not belong to its owner
rather than to the person seeking to make unauthorized use of it.
Id. at 141, 67 A. at 394.
85 Id.
A public figure is defined as one who has "arrived at a position where public
attention is focused upon him as a person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1106 (5th
ed. 1979) (citation omitted).
87 A non-public figure is one who has not thrust himself into the limelight of
public attention nor sought recognition or fame. See Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974), New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1954); Scott v.
News Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
This is an example of the essential reason to distinguish the right of property
from publicity rights. See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text; see also Kunz
v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 532 (1918) (where plaintiff was in defendant's store
and the defendant took some motion pictures of plaintiff without her knowledge
and exhibited them in a local theatre as advertising for his store). The court held
that this was an unlawful appropriation of plaintiffs property right in her picture.
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figures.89 On the other hand, only public figures may make a claim based
on publicity rights. Property rights, however, extend equally to both pri-
vate and public figures.
The main difference between appropriating the name or likeness of a
public figure and that of a non-public individual is the measure of dam-
ages. To determine the measure of damages for a public figure some
elements to consider are the fame of the public figure,90 the value of his
personality in the market place, 91 and the profits earned by the defendant
from the unauthorized commercial exploitation of the public figure. 92 In
the case of a non-public figure, "there is no pecuniary or market value
in the name, likeness, etc., of such a person until the defendant, by un-
lawfully appropriating the property rights in these aspects of plaintiff's
personality, establishes a pecuniary value and a market for them. In such
a case, the damages would be measured by the value to the defendant.""
Therefore, both public and non-public individuals have a property in-
terest in their name or likeness.94 A cause of action arises for both when
this interest is appropriated for commercial exploitation 5 A public figure,
however, may be able to claim greater damages because the worth of
appropriating a public figure's name or likeness is often greater to the
defendant than the appropriation of a private individual's characteristics.
This value is greater because when a defendant appropriates the char-
acteristics of a public figure he is also appropriating the publicity and
recognition that the public figure has achieved.
B. Expansive Interpretations of Name and Likeness
Various aspects of modern living such as radio, television, and satellite
communication have increased man's exposure to the world. This increase
in exposure has caused increased infringement upon one's common law
'9 See Ann-Margaret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (1986).
In that case, the defendants published a photograph of actress Ann-Margaret
partially nude. The photograph was taken from a scene in the motion picture
Magic. The plaintiff agreed to do the scene nude on the condition that few people
would be present during the filming and that no still photographs would be made.
Id. at 403 n.2. The plaintiffs claim alleged that defendant's unauthorized pub-
lication of the photograph violated § 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. The
trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and held the pub-
lication did not invade plaintiffs privacy. The court recognized that a celebrity
does not, simply by virtue of his or her notoriety, lose all rights to privacy but
the court noted that "such right can be severely circumscribed as a result of an
individual's newsworthiness." Id. at 405.
1 Gordon, supra note 17, at 610-611.
91 Id.
92 Id.
91 Id. at 611.
9 See supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
"' W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, at 853-54. However, there is some
controversy regarding whether the element of commercial exploitation is nec-
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rights. The common law established property rights in name and likeness.
These characteristics were protected because they were the essence of
recognition at the time. However, to combat increased technology the
courts have had to interpret common law property rights more expan-
sively and incorporate various intangible aspects of an individual's iden-
tity. In fact, it has been recognized that "[piroperty is not necessarily a
taxable thing. It may consist of things incorporeal, and things incorporeal
may consist of rights common in every man.
96
1. Name
Courts have liberally interpreted what constitutes a name and there-
fore what is protected under a property right in one's name. For example,
in Orsini v. Eastern Wine Corp.9 7 the court concluded that the defendant's
use of the plaintiffs coat of arms and his surname on the defendant's
wine labels was tantamount to the unauthorized appropriation of the
plaintiff's name.98 The court held that use of the coat of arms and surname
presented a method of identification of the plaintiff which was as effective
as the use of a full name.99
Another example of this type of liberal interpretation is seen in Hirsch
v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc.. 0° The court held that the defendant un-
lawfully appropriated plaintiffs well known nickname, "Crazylegs," to
market women's shaving gel. The court recognized the fact that an in-
dividual's full or actual name does not have to be appropriated to maintain
a cause of action. All that is required is that the nickname used clearly
identify that person.10'
Once it is shown that a certain manifestation of an individual's name
is protected under the established property right in the name, the indi-
vidual must also show that the name was appropriated for commercial
exploitation. If this is not shown, as was the case in Rand v. Hearst
Corp., ' 0 2 no recovery for the appropriation of the plaintiffs name will be
allowed. In Rand, on the back cover of a book which the defendant pub-
lished, an excerpt of a critical review comparing the book to the work of
well-known author, Ayn Rand, was reproduced. 0 3 The Rand court held
that the plaintiff could not recover because the use of her name was merely
incidental to the right of the publisher to inform the public of the nature
of the book. 0 4 Therefore, it seems clear that one may use another's name
for reference but must be careful not to overstep the bounds and com-
mercially exploit that name for profit.
Munde v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076, 1078 (1911).
91190 Misc. 235, 73 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1947).
98 Id.
9Id. at 427.
"00 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979).
101 Id. at 382, 280 N.W.2d at 137.
02 31 A.D.2d 406, 298 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1969).
103 Id. at 408, 298 N.Y.S.2d 407.
104 Although Ayn Rand possessed common law property rights in her name,
these rights were not appropriated in this instance for the main purpose of ben-
efiting the defendant. See also Gordon, supra note 17, at 582.
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2. Likeness
Property rights in one's likeness have also been expanded to include
indicia of identity other than the well-established property right in one's
picture.'0 5
Recovery has been allowed for the appropriation of one's likeness when
the defendant used a parody'0 6 of a person in a commercial context. 10 7 In
the case of Ali v. Playgirl,10 8 the defendant published a portrait of a nude
black man seated in a boxing ring. The plaintiff, Muhammad Ali, claimed
this portrait was unmistakably recognizable as himself. The court held
that any representation which is recognizable as the likeness of the com-
plaining party is sufficient to sustain a cause of action for the appropri-
ation of one's picture. 109 The court allowed recovery in this instance
because the composite drawing was clearly identifiable as the plaintiff.110
A cause of action for the appropriation of one's likeness has also been
sustained when the appropriation involved the use of a look-alike. In
Onassis v. Christian-Dior New York, Inc."' a look-alike model of Jac-
queline Kennedy Onassis was hired and used in a Christian Dior adver-
tisement. This advertisement was produced without Onassis's consent.
The New York Supreme Court granted Onassis's request and ordered an
injunction restraining the defendants from further use of this advertise-
ment. 112 Justice Edward J. Greenfield stated: "If we truly value the right
of privacy in a world of exploitation, where every mark of distinctiveness
becomes grist for the mills of publicity, then we must give it more than
lip service and grudging recognition." 13 This extension by the Onassis
court upholds the rationale behind the recognition of a property right in
one's likeness. The use of a look-alike to appropriate a person's likeness
is as intrusive and violative of that person's identity as the appropriation
of an actual likeness.
105 See infra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
106 See Hustler Magazine & Larry Flynt v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). A parody
"makes use of another's attributes as part of a larger presentation, in which a
considerable amount of the content is provided by the parodist." Felcher & Rubin,
supra note 8, at 1605. Generally, parody tends to be protected due to this input
of creativity. However, if a parody "actually appropriates substantial amounts of
the original material, and thus relies on the original rather than its own contri-
butions for its appeal, it will not be protected no matter how humorous its intent."
Id. at 1605.
107 Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
log Id.
109 Id. at 726-27.
110 Id.
11 122 Misc.2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984), affd, 110 A.D.2d 1095,
488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1st Dept. 1985).
112 Id. Although Onassis was decided pursuant to N.Y Civ. Rights Law § 50
and 51 (McKinney 1983), the case is supportive of the liberal interpretation that
has been granted to likeness. See supra note 79.
113 Onassis, 122 Misc.2d at 610, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261. In this decision, Justice
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Although courts have liberally construed an individual's right in his
or her likeness, they have been somewhat reluctant to expand this to
include the events of one's life. The case of Melvin v. Reid' 4 involved a
motion picture entitled "The Red Kimono" based on incidents in a former
prostitute's life who had been tried for murder and acquitted while a
prostitute. The plaintiff alleged that the film was released eight years
after she had "abandoned her life of shame and became entirely reha-
bilitated."116 The plaintiff filed her suit alternatively on grounds of in-
vasion of privacy and the appropriation of property rights in her name
and incidents of her life. The court refused to include the incidents of
one's life under the protection of property rights in one's likeness. 116 The
court did not find that plaintiff's personality was appropriated by the
defendant's imitation of her dress, walk, thoughts, and emotions. How-
ever, it seems that this is a clear appropriation of plaintiff's identity.
Recognizing a property right in one's history when a depiction of that
history clearly identifies the person is clearly in line with the rationale
given for recognizing property rights in one's name and likeness."
1 7
Thus, the property rights in name and likeness established in the com-
mon law have expanded to encompass various appropriations that courts
have considered tantamount to name and likeness. Courts have liberally
construed common law property rights to include various other manifes-
tations of identity.
C. Property Rights in Voice
1. Protectability of Voice
The human voice is one of the most palpable ways an individual is
recognized." 8 It is as central to the essence of one's identity as name or
likeness. As the Court stated in Midler v. Ford Motor Co.," s "[I]t has been
observed that with the sound of a voice, the other stands before me.'
120
A central issue currently being raised with the advent of the mass media
and advances in sound technology is the protectability of one's voice and
the availability of a cause of action when it is appropriated.'
12
114 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
116 Id.
116 Id. at 292, 297 P. at 93. Cf. Toscani v. Hersey, 65 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1946). The
court, however, held that publication of incidents in the past life of a reformed
prostitute was actionable as an invasion of her right under the Califoria Consti-
tution to pursue and obtain happiness.
117 See Gordon, supra note 17, at 591. See also notes 79-93 and accompanying
discussion.
"'8 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
119849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
120 Id. (citing D. IHDE, LISTENING AND VOICE 77 (1976)).
121 Singer-actor Tom Waits filed a $2 million suit on November 1, 1988, against
Frito-Lay, Inc. and its advertising agency, Tracy Locke, claiming Frito-Lay's radio
advertisement imitated his voice so that it appeared Wait was endorsing their
product. Trial is set for February 1990 at the time of publication of this Note.
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In Midler, Ford Motor Company and its advertising agency, Young and
Rubicam, Inc., used an actress to imitate Bette Midler's voice in a 1985
television advertisement for the Ford Lincoln Mercury. 22 Midler sued for
the appropriation of her voice. The United States Court of Appeals re-
versed the trial court and held that the defendants tortiously appropriated
part of Midler's identity for their own profit in selling their product. 23
In reaching this conclusion the court relied on Motschenbacher v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co.12 4 In Motschenbacher, the defendant used a pho-
tograph of plaintiffs famous race car for a cigarette commercial. Although
the characteristics of the car were somewhat altered, 125 the plaintiff was
seated in the car. However, his features were not visible and he could not
be recognized in the photograph. The court held that the defendant in-
vaded plaintiffs property interest in his own identity.
The key element in both Midler and Motschenbacher that gave rise to
a cause of action for the appropriation of the plaintiffs identity was the
defendant's appropriation of some aspect of the plaintiffs identity to con-
vey the impression that the plaintiff was endorsing the defendant's prod-
uct. In Motschenbacher, although the plaintiff could not be seen, the ad
suggested that it was him by emphasizing signs or symbols associated
with him. 126 In Midler the defendants used a sound-alike to convey the
impression that Midler was singing for them.127
The Midler court found no reason to distinguish the fact that voice,
rather than likeness, was used as the symbol of identity. In fact, the court
recognized that "a voice is as distinctive and personal as a face."'128 The
court apparently could find no reason not to expand the common law
property right in name and likeness to include voice. 29 The court correctly
See Tom Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. et al. Case No. CU88-06478-JM1 (filed Nov. 1,
1988, Dt. Ct., Los Angeles); see also Goldstein, Pop-Eye: Waits - Is Frito a Ban-
dito? Los Angeles Times, Oct. 23, 1988, at p. 85, for a general discussion of Waits's
claim. Other celebrities also have claims pending regarding the protectability of
their voice. For example, comedian-actor Rodney Dangerfield has sued Park Inns
International, Inc. alleging that it has used an imitation of his voice in its com-
mercials. See Shapiro & Olson, Encore Performances: Do You Want to Sue? Climbs
the Charts, Legal Times, January 15, 1990, at p. 27.
122 Ford Motor Company and Young & Rubicam, Inc., contacted Midler's agent
and asked if Midler would be interested in doing the television commercial. When
the offer was declined they hired Ula Hedwig, a former back-up singer for Midler.
They directed Hedwig to sing the Bette Midler song "Do You Want To Dance."
Hedwig was directed to "sound as much as possible like the Bette Midler record."
Id. at 461.
123 Id. at 463.
14 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
The number of the car was changed and a wing-like device known as a
"spoiler" was attached to the car. However, the car's features of white pinpointing,
an oval medallion and solid red covering were retained. Id. at 822.128 Id. at 827.
127 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).128 Id. at 463.
I" See contra Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
In this case, the musical group, "The Fifth Dimension," brought suit for the
unauthorized imitation of its unique vocal sound, particularly associated with its
song "Up, Up and Away." The defendant appropriated this unique sound in its
use of a song in a television commercial. The court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. In doing so, the court held that the defendants had
not violated any privacy or personal rights of the plaintiffs. Id. at 1147.
[Vol. 37:3
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol37/iss3/7
HOW MUCH OF YOU DO YOU REALLY OWN?
recognized that one's voice is as central to the essence of one's identity
as is name or likeness.
13 0
A similar recognition was reached in Alistair Sim v. H.J. Heinz Co.'
3 1
The plaintiff, a well-known British actor, brought suit to enjoin the de-
fendant from using an alleged imitation of his voice in a television com-
mercial endorsing defendant's product. Although the application for an
injunction was denied on appeal, 132 Justice Hodson expressed some doubt,
stating: "[iut would seem a grave defect in the law if it were possible for
a party, for the purpose of commercial gain, to make use of the voice of
another party without his consent.' 1
33
Case law regarding the protectability of one's voice suggests that rec-
ognition of such protection hinges upon the cause of action brought. For
example, in Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,13 4 Nancy Sinatra
sued Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company and its advertising agency, Young
& Rubicam, Inc., on the basis of an advertising campaign featuring the
song "These Boots Are Made For Walkin"' which is closely identified with
her. The female singers of the song were alleged to have imitated her
voice and style of singing. 3 5 The basis of Sinatra's complaint, however,
was unfair competition. She claimed the song and the arrangement had
acquired a secondary meaning which was protectable. 1 6 The court af-
firmed summary judgment for the defendants. In doing this the court
recognized that the defendants "had paid a very substantial sum to the
copyright proprietor to obtain the license for the use of the song and all
of its arrangements.
1 3 7
The outcome of the Sinatra case may have been different if the plaintiff
had brought her claim under an appropriation theory. Nancy Sinatra was
claiming relief under a copyright theory.138 However, a voice is not "co-
pyrightable."'3 9 The sounds are not "fixed. 1 40 In fact, it has been recog-
130 Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
131 W.L.R. 313 (1959).
132 A prime reason for the denial of an injunction was the fact that the plaintiff
included a count for libel in his complaint. The court then let the entire decision
rest on the rule that equity will not enjoin a libel. Id.
"3 W.L.R. 313 at 317.





1"I Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988).
140 Id. The 1976 Copyright Act protects works "fixed in a tangible medium of
expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). The Copyright Act § 102 provides that:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following
categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying
music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
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Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co.142 is another example where the protecta-
bility of voice was avoided due to the cause of action maintained. Co-
median Bert Lahr brought suit against the defendant for selling Lestoil
using a television commercial featuring a cartoon film of a duck accom-
panied by an imitation of Lahr's voice. The First Circuit Court of Appeals
held that Lahr had stated a cause of action for unfair competition because
it could be found that the defendant's conduct saturated Lahr's audience
and curtailed his market.143 To maintain an action for unfair competition,
competition in the same market must exist between the plaintiff and
defendant. 44 No such requirement is necessary in a property action.
The Lahr court did not decide this case on the grounds of appropriation
of voice, yet the court did recognize that the defendant was stealing the
plaintiff's thunder by using a sound-alike. 145 The court also recognized
that the defendant's commercial had greater value because its audience
believed it was listening to the plaintiff.146 These are all elements of the
tortious appropriation of one's identity, yet the court did not address this
issue.147
These cases indicate that courts do recognize the uniqueness of one's
voice 14 and will equate it with an individual's identity. This recognition,
along with the history of liberal interpretations regarding what consti-
tutes name or likeness, suggests that a property right in voice should
exist and be judicially recognized or protected.
There are, however, certain public policy reasons for restricting the
enlargement of property rights to include voice. For example, it is argued
that performances would have to be policed. 149 This task, however, would
be difficult, if not impossible. It is also argued that the prevention of
others from imitating a performer's voice, sounds, or mannerisms may
impede, rather than "promote the Progress of... useful Arts."5 °
(7) sound recordings.(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of au-
thorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.Id.
d1Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
142 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
1Id. at 259.
- Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 1970).
145Lahr, 300 F.2d at 259. Lahr based his complaint primarily on the grounds
that the imitation caused a mistake in identity. Id.
146d.
147 Id.
141 The Lahr court recognized that: "Plaintiff here alleges a peculiar style and
type of performance, unique in a far broader sense. Before going further into this
matter ... we think plaintiffs adjectival allegations should be tested in the
crucible." Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962).
149 See Booth v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
150 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, 8). Although these arguments against expan-
sion of the right of property to include voice are valid, they are overly conservative.
The same arguments can be made on behalf of restricting the recognition of
property rights in name and likeness, yet these rights exist and are viable.
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2. Extent of this Protection: Entertainment Value
Versus Commercial Advertising Value
Once the existence of a property right in an individual's voice is judi-
cially recognized, the additional problem of the extent to which protection
should be provided invariably will arise. The issue remains whether this
protection should extend to the realm of comedy and prohibit the act of
comedians such as Rich Little, whose entire act is focused around his re-
creation of famous persons.
A central element in the maintenance of a cause of action for the
appropriation of identity, whether it be name, likeness, or voice, has been
proving that the appropriation was for the purpose of commercial ex-
ploitation.'5 ' There is a distinction between the good faith imitation of
another's voice or performance for entertainment purposes and the ap-
propriation of them for commercial advertising. 52 A person's imitation
of another for entertainment purposes actually produces a new creation.
The imitator is not using the characteristics as his own. He is embel-
lishing the characteristics with his own creativity as a type of art form.
The test in making the distinction between good faith imitation and
appropriation is whether the impersonator is "flying under his own ban-
ner."153 An example of this is Murray v. Rose."4 In Murray, the plaintiff
sought to enjoin the defendants from staging vaudeville imitations of her
act. The court denied relief stating:
[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that skilled performers
have become famous and successful financially as "imitators."
Veteran theater goers will recall Elsie Janis and Cissie Loftus.
When they gave due credit to the persons imitated, the latter
were pleased with the compliment involved. There is no claim
here that the imitation is other than fair. It is not charged that
it aims to ridicule or to provoke anything but admiration for
the skill of the plaintiff and her imitators. The public is not in
any measure deceived.
1 55
151 See supra notes 79-124 and accompanying text. Although the cases discussed
all contained the element of commercial exploitation, the necessity of this re-
quirement is questionable. See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
"I Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and Humorous
Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 225, 253 (1962). Netterville states, however, that
"[tihe right to be free from commercial exploitation of one's personality attributes
does not require either a 'property' right in those attributes nor any palming off."
Id. at 253. This assumption, however, contributes to the confusion surrounding
property, privacy and publicity rights. Before a cause of action for commercial
appropriation can be made, property rights in the attribute appropriated must
be recognized. Any other conclusion confuses the distinguishable rights of prop-
erty, privacy and publicity. See supra notes 6-61 and accompanying text.
'13 Netterville, supra note 152, at 250, citing Supreme Records v. Decca Records,
90 F. Supp. 904 (S. D. Cal. 1950).
1 30 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1941).
15 Id. at 7.
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The good-faith imitation of a famous person to achieve humor or to
effect criticism is supported by the public interest in entertainment. How-
ever, a distinction must be drawn between the entertainment use of im-
itation of an individual's voice on a sporadic basis and use of it on a
continuing basis.156 The use of imitation on a continuing basis, such as
using a famous actor's voice as the basis for a cartoon figure, may be
actionable. This use comes closer to the requirement that the appropri-
ation be for commercial exploitation. That is, appropriating another's
valuable attributes on a continuing basis "may divest the actor of his
ability to realize the full fruits of the labors he has expended in developing
his performance and bar him from employment which otherwise might
be available.
1 5 7
Thus, protection of one's voice should be limited. Although it is true
that entertainers imitate famous people as part of their livelihood and
for financial gain, the distinction between imitation for sporadic enter-
tainment value and imitation for commercial advertising is clear.
IV. PROPERTY INTEREST IN IDENTITY
A. Ownership of Identity as Opposed to Characteristics
Courts have recognized the existence of property interests in various
characteristics. This recognition has extended to such characteristics as
name, likeness, and voice. However, the better view is a recognition that
a person has a property interest in his identity, rather than the discrete
components of that identity. This view is supported by the fact that the
majority of decisions recognizing property interests in characteristics did
so because these characteristics constituted the essence of the individual's
identity.158
1,6 Netterville, supra note 152, at 254. See also Supreme Records v. Decca
Records, 90 F. Supp. 904, 909 (S. D. Cal. 1950). There is also a difference between
using an imitation or a portrayal for information and non-information purposes.
If a portrayal is used for purposes of entertainment by depicting real people, it
will generally be protected by the first amendment. A non-informative enter-
tainment portrayal, on the other hand, must rely on its own creative elements
as the basis of its claim of social value. If the portrayal is the product of some
observable creative effort, it will often be deemed worthy of protection. For ex-
ample, a fictitious work may use names or attributes of real people, provided the
resulting portrayal is clearly presented as fiction. Felcher & Rubin, supra note
5, at 1596-98. See also Hicks v. Casablanca Records & Filmworks, 464 F. Supp.
426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (film based on entirely fictionalized incident in Agatha Chris-
tie's life protected by first amendment); Leopold v. Levin, 45 Ill.2d 434, 259 N.E.2d
250 (1970) (fictionalized film based on the lives of Leopold and Lolb was protected
by the first amendment). However, a work that merely capitalizes on the attri-
butes of another without contributing anything substantially unique or new will
likely be subject to liability. See Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124,
233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969)
(deliberately false account of baseball player Warren Spahn's life presented as a
factual biography incurred liability).
157 Netterville, supra note 152, at 254.
15 See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Onassis v.
Christian Dior-New York, 122 Misc.2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984),
aff'd, 110 A.D.2d 1095, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1st Dept. 1985); Motschenbacher v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Halpern, supra note
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Once this property interest in identity is recognized, it must be estab-
lished what characteristics manifest the identity of the person. The ap-
propriation of certain recognized characteristics such as name, likeness,
and voice is sufficient to constitute the manifestation of identity.1 9 How-
ever, there are certain instances where the appropriation of a combination
of characteristics (that alone would be insufficient to constitute identity)
has been held to be tantamount to the appropriation of one's identity. For
example, in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,160 the court
held that the appropriation of a racing car similar to the plaintiff's, with
similar markings and a fuzzy image of an unidentifiable man seated in
the car, was sufficient to evoke the identity of the plaintiff.8 1 Therefore,
the crucial determination is not what characteristics have been appro-
priated, but rather, whether the characteristics, alone or in combination,
are sufficient to serve as a conduit through which the identity of the
plaintiff is evoked.
The intent necessary to violate one's property interest in identity may
be likened to a conversion action. The tort of conversion occurs when
there is an interference with an individual's property so severe that it
constitutes a forced sale to the defendant. 8 2 Similarly, a violation of one's
property interest in identity will occur when the defendant appropriates
the plaintiffs identity in such a way as to constitute a forced sale. The
appropriation of one's identity for commercial exploitation is an example
of interference so severe as to constitute a forced sale. However, com-
mercial exploitation is simply one example of when the requisite inter-
ference will be satisfied.'r'
This analogy to conversion will also help determine the applicable
measure of damages for a violation of one's property right. In a conversion
action the defendant must pay the full value of the property converted. 164
Similarly, when the defendant violates one's property interest in identity
he is responsible for restoring the value that was lost. This must be
distinguished from the applicable damages in a publicity action where
the damages encompass the restitution of gain the defendant derived from
the appropriation. 65
63, at 1243-45 for a discussion of identity in the context of celebrities and the
right of publicity.
"I See supra notes 79-149 and accompanying text.
160 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 822, 825.
162 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, at 80-93.
16 In determining whether a forced sale has occurred in a conversion action,
all of the relevant factors in the case are to be considered. These include the
extent and duration of the defendant's control over the property, his intent to
assert a right which is inconsistent with the plaintiffs right of control, the de-
fendant's good or bad faith intentions, the harm done to the chattel, and the
expense and inconvenience the plaintiff incurred. Id. at 90. These same elements
can be considered to determine if there was sufficient interference to violate the
plaintiff's property right in identity.
1 Id. at 89-90.
llHalpern, supra note 63.
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Although this analogy to conversion is useful to illustrate when an
individual's property right in identity is violated, this property right is
not a conversion action. In a true conversion action the defendant actually
takes the property away from the plaintiff. However, the identity of a
person can never be removed. Therefore, a cause of action for the appro-
priation of one's identity must rest in property.
B. Limits on Which Characteristics Constitute Identity
Certain characteristics such as name, likeness, and voice serve as the
conduit of one's identity. However, there are other characteristics that
are insufficient to manifest one's identity.
A prime example of this type of characteristic is found in Shaw v. Time-
Life Records.166 Artie Shaw, a band leader from the "swing era," brought
an action against a music publisher, asserting that the publisher's "swing
era" series of recordings invaded his privacy, made unauthorized use of
his name, damaged his reputation, and unfairly competed with his own
phonographic records. The New York Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiff did not have a property interest in the Artie Shaw "sound.' ' 6 7
A similar issue was raised in Miller v. Universal Pictures Co.'" In
Miller, the defendant imitated the sounds of original Glenn Miller or-
chestral renditions for use in a photoplay of the leader's life. The de-
fendant was licensed to simulate these sounds for the film but was not
authorized to make recordings from the track, which was ultimately done.
The New York Supreme Court reversed the trial court. The court held
that there is no property right in the distinctive sound of a band which
the plaintiff could claim had been appropriated. 169
In these cases, the issue was not the appropriation of an individual's
voice. It was the alleged appropriation of musical arrangements that were
popularized by a certain band. Both courts concluded that a property
right does not exist in this instance. These cases illustrate situations
where the appropriation of an identifying feature which may cause the
thought of a person to be evoked is insufficient to constitute a manifes-
tation of that identity. 70
166 379 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1975).
167 Id.
-- 11 A.D.2d 47, 201 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1960), affd, 10 N.Y.2d 972, 180 N.E.2d
248 (1961).
169 Id.
170 Another example of an instance in which the thought of a person may be
evoked by the appropriation of certain characteristics but where these are in-
sufficient to sustain a cause of action is Maila Nurmi aka Vampira v. Cassandra
Peterson aka Elivra, 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9765 (1989). In this case the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant, a horror movie hostess called Elvira, appropriated
certain props, clothes and mannerisms that were similar to those used by plaintiff
in the 1950's when she performed a character called vampira. Id. at 1. The court
held that plaintiff had no cause of action under either a privacy or publicity
theory. In all probability the plaintiff would not have succeeded even if she had
brought her action based upon a privacy right because the defendant created
"merely a suggestive resemblance" of the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiffs identity, as
expressed through her character, Varnpira, was not evoked.
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A similar issue regarding the use of sound as a characteristic mani-
festing identity has recently been raised in the field of sound recordings.
Certain unusual tonal qualities have become associated with an individ-
ual performer and claims have recently been made that these musicians
are recognizable upon hearing only a very few notes.171 This claim has
laid the foundation for the issue regarding the protectability of discrete
sounds.
For example, percussionist David Earl Johnson is well known in music
circles for the unique drum sound he achieves when playing a set of rare
African instruments. 172 Jan Hammer, producer, sampled 173 this sound,
which later appeared in a number of recordings and broadcasts including
the introductory music to the television show Miami Vice. 74
The technology of sound sampling has led to the appropriation of certain
distinctive musical sounds that are not "copyrightable."'175 Since the
sounds are not copyrightable a musician often has great difficulty in
sustaining a claim when "his" sound has been sampled. This difficulty
arises because sound sampling appropriates the underlying tonal quali-
ties of a sound rather than the phrasing of the sound. 76 In addition, it is
171 See DeCurtis, Who Owns a Sound?, Rolling Stone 13 (Dec. 4, 1986); see also,
Dissonant Issues of Sound Sampling, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1986, at C23, col. 4
(reporting that singer Chris Squire's voice was sampled and used on the album
The Art of Noise).
172 DeCurtis, supra note 171.
113 Sound sampling is a way of "appropriating the distinct tonal qualities of a
particular vocal or instrumental sound so that it may be used in a different musical
context." Note, Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity: Protecting
Against the Electronic Appropriation of Sounds, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1723, 1724
(1987). The process of digital sound sampling appropriates the underlying tonal
qualities of a sound. Although various components of a sound such as note se-
lection, rhythm and phrasing may be altered by an engineer using a synthesizer,
the underlying sound that has been appropriated is still the sound of the musician
whose recordings or live performance has been sampled. Id. at 1725. This tech-
nique of sound sampling has wide economic repercussions. A sound that has been
sampled can be exploited in a variety of ways. If a successful record features a
distinctive instrumental sound, that sound can be cloned and used on a different
record. Id. at 1726. Also, buying and selling the sounds of a sampled musician
creates a type of black market. Id. This has the effect of putting instrumental
musicians out of work. Since the sounds can be easily sampled there is little
reason to employ all the instrumental musicians who formerly would have been
necessary to achieve the desired sound. Id.7 DeCurtis, supra note 171. Earl Johnson allowed a keyboardist to "sample"
some of his rare instruments and distinctive sounds. Johnson then heard these
sounds featured on the Miami Vice (NBC) theme song. He subsequently went to
a copyright lawyer and tried to get the musician's union to define a payment
standard for sampling sessions and the use of sampled performances on recordings.Id.
175 Copyright protection does not extend to the most frequent instance in which
sampling occurs: when a performer is sampled live rather than off a record. See
Note, supra note 173, at 1727-29. This is because "live performances are not
themselves 'fixed in any tangible medium of expression... as required by the
Copyright Act of 1976. Note, supra note 173, at 1727 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982)). In this instance it is similar to the copyright problems regarding the
protection of voice. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
176 See Note, supra note 173, at 1740. Most instrumentalist musicians are rec-
ognizable primarily because of their distinctive phrasing rather than the tonal
qualities of a sound, which is another reason for the difficulty in maintaining an
action when their sound has been sampled. Id.
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common in the music industry for musicians to copy another's playing
style, and "protection against mere imitation of another's playing style,
without more, would be impractical and impossible to administer."
1 77
This difficulty in sustaining a claim when sound has been
appropriated 178 may be overcome if the musician bases his claim upon a
property right in his identity. If the appropriation of a sound is sufficient
to cause the image of the performer to be evoked, the musician's identity,
as expressed through sound, has been appropriated. 179 This situation must
be distinguished, however, from cases such as Shaw v. Time-Life
Records180 and Miller v. Universal Pictures Co."" In these cases, all that
was imitated was a playing style. This imitation may have caused one
to be reminded of the imitated; however, this mere fleeting impression of
the performer is insufficient to evoke the identity of the performer.
8 2
V. CONCLUSION
Historically, courts have recognized property rights in certain personal
characteristics. This recognition was premised on the theory that those
characteristics constituted the essence of one's identity and therefore,
should be protected. Initially, protected characteristics were limited to
name and likeness. Gradually, property rights were found in manifes-
tations of these characteristics, such as nicknames, symbols, and look-
alikes. Recently, questions regarding the existence of common-law prop-
erty rights in voice and sound have been raised.
As property rights in name and likeness expanded to include other
indicia of identity it became evident that the true property right exists
in the more nebulous concept of identity. Characteristics serve merely as
a conduit of this identity.
A violation of one's property right in identity occurs when character-
istics that evoke this identity are appropriated. In order for the identity
of a person to be evoked, the characteristic or combination of character-
istics must create a personification of the one imitated. The mere recol-
lection of the person is insufficient.
This recognition of a property right in identity will eliminate the ex-
isting confusion among property, privacy, and publicity rights. It will also
give an individual whose identity has been appropriated by another a
sounder legal basis to assert a cause of action.
KATHLEEN BIRKEL DANGELO
117 Id. at 1740 n.109.
178 See generally Note, supra note 173, for a general discussion of the musician's
difficulty in maintaining a cause of action when his sound has been sampled.
179 See generally Soocher, License to Sample, Nat'l L.J., February 13, 1989, at
1.
1IO 379 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1975); see also supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
'' 11 A.D.2d 47, 201 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1960), affid, 10 N.Y.2d 972, 180 N.E.2d
248 (1961); see also notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
182 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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